Japan's policy towards the South China Sea - applying "proactive peace diplomacy"? by Drifte, Reinhard
www.ssoar.info
Japan's policy towards the South China Sea -
applying "proactive peace diplomacy"?
Drifte, Reinhard
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Drifte, R. (2016). Japan's policy towards the South China Sea - applying "proactive peace diplomacy"? (PRIF
Reports, 140). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-49023-2
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
PRIF Report No. 140 
the
Japan’s Policy towards the 
South China Sea – 
Applying “Proactive Peace 
Diplomacy”?  
Reinhard Drifte
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2016 
 
 
Contact: 
PRIF  Baseler Straße 27–31  60329 Frankfurt am Main  Germany 
Phone: +49 69 959104-0  Fax: +49 69 558481 
E-Mail: reinhard.drifte@newcastle.ac.uk  Website: www.rfwdrifte.ukgo.com  
www.prif.org 
 
ISBN: 978-3-946459-09-5 
 
10 € 
  
Summary 
Japan’s policy towards the South China Sea (SCS) is likely to have a considerable bearing 
on the future shape of the regional order in this region although ultimately US-China 
competition and the reaction of the other countries around the SCS will have a more 
decisive bearing.  
As China is reinforcing its claims to most of the SCS through political, economic, 
military and legal means, Japan has become more involved as one of the top world trading 
nations with considerable political, economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia, as 
a security alliance partner of the US, and as a country which has territorial as well as 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border disputes with China in the East China Sea (ECS).  
This involvement has to be seen against the background of the general deterioration in 
the Japanese-Chinese relationship and lack of mutual trust which is due to not only the 
disputes in the ECS, but also to mutual suspicion generated by sharply diverging 
perceptions of military developments in the other country, the way Japan confronts its 
past aggression, and competitive if not antagonistic regional roles. China’s SCS policies 
therefore fit into Japan’s narrative of the “China Threat”, whereas Japan’s SCS policies fit 
into China’s narrative of Japan as a troublemaker at the side of the US.  
The ultimate issue which this report attempts to address is whether Japan’ s policies, as 
part of Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive peace diplomacy”, can contribute to a reduction 
of tensions and to regional stability, or whether it will only exacerbate the situation as the 
Chinese government is adamantly asserting. 
In the first part, this report analyses the various interests of Japan in the SCS region. 
Through trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Japan has established in Southeast 
Asia a so-called network economy. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, 85%–
90% of Japan’s oil imports (roughly 75% of China’s oil imports), and 33% of Japan’s LNG 
imports pass through the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) of the SCS. The main 
natural resources of interest to Japan are fishing and energy resources. Important 
economic interests are related to Japan’s involvement in the off-shore (as well as on-
shore) prospection and extraction of oil and gas resources in the SCS region in order to 
pursue the goal of diversification of supply of hydrocarbon as well as the marketing of 
Japan’s high technology services in the energy sector. Almost no attention has been given 
in the media or academic literature to this kind of Japanese involvement. However, some 
of the off-shore oil and gas blocks put out to tender by Vietnam, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia lie within China’s geographically ill-defined (no 
coordinates provided) and politically ambiguous (does it mark territorial waters, EEZ 
borders, or traditional fishing areas?) 10-dash line which overlaps with the EEZs and 
continental shelves claimed by these littoral countries. Still, Japan’s off-shore involvement 
is of a relatively modest scale, focusing on exploration and operating as part of joint 
ventures with bigger companies. With China’s growing military posture in the SCS, its 
improved technology, its increasing energy consumption and the increasing dependence 
of the littoral countries on China, however, Beijing may one day decide to move more 
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resolutely against some of the littoral countries encroaching on what it considers to be its 
resources which would impact on these Japanese interests. 
But not only economic interests but also geostrategic concerns have made the stability 
of the ASEAN member states of central importance to Japan. Next to Japan’s dependence 
on the freedom of navigation through the SCS, it is the nexus of its security alliance with 
the US and the interdependence of the security in the ECS and the SCS. Standing up to 
Chinese assertiveness in the SCS and supporting in some way the other littoral states of 
the SCS is perceived as necessary to maintain US support against Chinese policies in the 
ECS, i.e. the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the unresolved EEZ 
border demarcation which have given rise to considerable tensions. This linkage has 
become an important rationale for Prime Minister Abe’s policy of creating the political 
and constitutional environment to deepen security cooperation under the bilateral Japan-
US security treaty and to enhance Japan’s security policy as a “Proactive Peace 
Diplomacy”.  
In the second part, this report gives an overview of Japan’s various multilateral, 
minilateral and bilateral policies to address its interests against a complex political, 
strategic and legal background. Until recently, Japan mostly contributed to stability of the 
region through economic means, i.e. trade, investment and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), and through supporting ASEAN’s economic and political resilience 
and cohesion. In the face of China’s more assertive policies, the mirror perception of the 
tensions in the SCS and ECS, doubts among many Asian leaders about the reliability of 
the US commitment to balance the Chinese policies, and ASEAN’s fragmented position 
concerning the SCS, the economy-centred Japanese policies seem no longer to be 
sufficient and Japan is moving to switch to policies which put less emphasis on 
multilateral approaches and instead focus more on certain countries and on policies 
which are more security-related. The Japanese government has therefore started helping 
the more vocal SCS littoral states with their coast guard and military capacity. This 
enhanced security cooperation entails a stronger defence diplomacy, the use of ODA for 
coast guards, and naval support. The increased Japanese involvement in the security of 
the SCS has been very much promoted by the US through various new bilateral defence 
policy agreements but so far Japan has resisted proposals to join multilateral air or naval 
patrols in the SCS. 
In the conclusions the report analyses political difficulties and costs in implementing 
Japan’s comprehensive policies towards the SCS, apart from enhanced security involvement 
being hindered by Japan’s still powerful pacifism, constitutional restraints and budgetary 
limitations. One difficulty for Japan’s involvement in the SCS is the divergence among the 
littoral countries regarding their security priorities and the mix of policy tools to confront 
China on the territorial issues. Another problem is subtle differences between Japan and the 
US in emphasis of what region is more important and where/how to deploy limited 
resources. Finally, there is China’s strong opposition to any country outside the SCS to 
oppose its advances in the region, and the political and military means at China’s disposal to 
deter Japan from hindering it. These means range from declaring high-level exchanges as 
inopportune, to raising military tensions in the ECS.  
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The author concludes that the effectiveness of Japan’s SCS policies under Abe’s Proactive 
Peace Diplomacy in achieving Japan’s political, strategic and economic interests could 
therefore be enhanced by a more balanced mix of political, economic and security policies, 
most notably against a background of a better relationship between Japan and China. The 
high visibility of the security focus of Abe’s diplomacy towards the SCS is not helpful. In the 
end, however, the more determining factors for achieving regional stability in the SCS lie 
with the US-China relationship and the reactions of the other claimants to it. 
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“History has taught us that emerging powers are more likely to commit calamitous 
mistakes than other countries. China is offered many important strategic 
opportunities. Still, however, it is imperative for it to do everything possible to 
avoid plunging into the traps on its way for progress.”1  
(Wang Jisi, President of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, 
Beijing University) 
1. Introduction 
The South China Sea (SCS) has become a showcase for how China is translating its 
considerable economic power into political and military power, and this development is 
also becoming a test case for the future of US regional supremacy and leadership and for 
what the Chinese government likes to call a new “big power relationship”. Japan’s policy 
towards the SCS is likely to have a considerable bearing on the future shape of the 
regional order in this region. As China is reinforcing its claims to most of the SCS 
through political, economic, military and legal means, Japan has become more involved as 
one of the top world trading nations with considerable political, economic and strategic 
interests in Southeast Asia, as a security alliance partner of the US, and as a country which 
has territorial as well as Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border disputes with China in 
the East China Sea (ECS). This involvement has to be seen against the background of the 
general deterioration in the Japanese-Chinese relationship and lack of mutual trust which 
is due to not only the disputes in the ECS, but also to mutual suspicion generated by 
sharply diverging perceptions of military developments in the other country, the way 
Japan confronts its past aggression, and competitive if not antagonistic regional roles. 
China’s SCS policies therefore fit into Japan’s narrative of the “China Threat”, whereas 
Japan’s SCS policies fit into China’s narrative of Japan as a troublemaker at the side of the 
US. This wider context of Japan-China relations cannot be dealt with within the limits of 
this report which is focusing on Japan’s involvement in the SCS as one aspect of the 
difficult Japan-China relationship and on how the bilateral disputes in the ECS is 
impacting on Japan’s SCS policies. 
Japanese policies for the SCS range from expressing a desire for a peaceful resolution 
of territorial and of administrative rights disputes based on international law, to helping 
some of the littoral states claiming territory and/or EEZs strengthen their maritime patrol 
and defence capabilities. There have even been public statements by American officials 
about the desirability of Japan becoming a member of joint air or naval patrols in the SCS. 
This report analyses first the various interests of Japan in the SCS region, and secondly 
how the Japanese government tries to address them against a complex political, strategic 
and legal background. This does not include a discussion of the legitimacy of the 
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territorial and EEZ claims by either China or the other claimants, since Japan does not 
take any position on these issues. 
So far Japan has mostly tried to contribute to stability of the region through economic 
means, i.e. trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA), and through supporting 
ASEAN’s economic and political resilience and cohesion. In the face of China’s more 
assertive policies in Asia, doubts among many Asian leaders about the reliability of the US 
commitment to balance these Chinese policies, and ASEAN’s fragmented position 
concerning the SCS, the gradual strengthening of Japan’s security policy is now also 
extending to Southeast Asia, particularly under Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive peace 
diplomacy”.2 
This “proactive peace diplomacy” is a slogan which intends to describe a more 
accelerated abandonment of Japan’s relative passive past security policy which relied for 
the country’s external defence posture on the US off-shore (US 7th Fleet) and on-shore 
(i.e. US troops in Japan) force deployment, and modest Japanese armed forces as 
deterrent for small-scale attacks. In the face of North Korea’s increasing force deployment 
(notably medium and long range missiles with possibly nuclear war heads), Chinese 
increased force deployment, the US demands for more Japanese defence efforts to support 
US deterrence in Asia, and the desire of the Japanese Right under Abe to become a 
“normal” country (i.e. stronger security and military policies), the current government 
wants to abandon what it perceives as a hitherto “passive diplomacy”. A major obstacle 
for the government is the Japanese constitution where Japan proclaims to rely on the 
goodwill of the world for its security and existence (Preamble) and renounces in Article 9 
the maintenance of all kind of military potential and the right of belligerency as a means 
to settle international dispute. Since this constitution is referred to as “Peace 
Constitution” (heiwa kempo) by the Left, the current government wants to facilitate 
public acceptance of its Realpolitik approach to security by appropriating “peace” in the 
slogan. This report provides therefore also a case illustration of how the current 
government implements a stronger security and military stance. 
The ultimate issue which this report attempts to address is whether Japan’s SCS 
policies as part of the current government’s greater focus on security issues can contribute 
to a reduction of tensions and to regional stability, or whether it will only exacerbate the 
situation as the Chinese government is adamantly asserting. I will conclude that the 
effectiveness of Japan’s SCS policies will in the end partly depend on a well balanced mix 
of political, economic and security policies which can convince all players of the dangers 
and pitfalls of power balancing, as well as on better relations between Japan and China. 
However, in the face of China’s unrelenting SCS policy and attempts to use the bilateral 
ECS disputes as a lever to counter Japan’s SCS involvement, Japan’s options and impact 
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security policy see Hughes 2015. 
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are rather limited. More decisive will be the US-China relationship and how the littoral 
countries will react to it.  
2. Overview of the Current Situation in the South China Sea 
According to the official Chinese position, all islands and reefs within the official Ten-
dash line (formerly known as Nine-dash line) as well as “the surrounding sea” belong 
historically to China.3 However, this position is at odds with the UN Convention on Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) which does not recognise any “historic rights” in such a context, the 
term “the surrounding sea” is vague and not part of the UNCLOS vocabulary, and the 
Ten-dash line has not been given any precise coordinates or meaning.4 The other 
claimants to parts of the SCS do not agree and have also overlapping claims with other 
littoral claimant states. However, there is no unified stance of the other claimants against 
China and their stances ranges from officially even denying any territorial conflict with 
China (Malaysia, Indonesia) to actively pursuing their claims (Philippines, Vietnam). 
Moreover, the littoral states of the SCS are divided on how strongly to confront China’s 
territorial position and its coercive behaviour towards some of the claimants because of 
domestic and foreign policy considerations and China’s growing economic importance. 
China opposes any multilateral talks on territorial issues despite the overlapping claims, 
thus increasing its negotiation power. Finally China rebuffs the involvement of any non-
littoral state, notably of the US and Japan. This complex situation alone makes it very 
difficult for any outside country to play a constructive role and to safeguard its political, 
economic and security interests. 
At the same time, China is asserting its territorial claim to most of the SCS in an 
increasingly assertive way – politically, economically, legally, and through policing and 
military means. It has created a new administrative unit to encompass part of the SCS 
(establishment of Sansha City in 2012), and established there fishing zone regulations 
which it enforces on all countries. Chinese companies have started to explore oil and gas 
resources in areas which are claimed by other littoral countries and China’s maritime 
militia and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces protect these ventures. Currently the 
greatest attention is raised by China’s extensive reclamation projects in eight locations 
across the Spratly Islands which are feared to lead to the establishment of military bases 
and a more efficient implementation of China’s territorial claims. Although China claims 
that these reclamation projects are finished, aerial observation proves the contrary. 
Regional and other outside powers fear that China will continue to cement its territorial 
claim by economic activities (fishing, tourism), further creating artificial islands 
(including floating islands), and that its reclamation activities would lead to the 
 
 
3  For the 10-dash line see State Oceanic Administration 2012: 381. 
4  For an official Chinese justification of “historical rights” in the SCS based on customary law rather than 
UNCLOS see Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 6 July 2016, 
http://bit.ly/2dUSFAZ. 
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establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), the creation of an exclusive 
fishing zone and finally threatening the freedom of navigation in a sea which is essential 
to the economy of many countries, including Japan’s. In view of China’s rather aggressive 
fishing activities (as Japan experienced e.g. in 2014 with Chinese fishing trawlers going for 
the protected red corals in Japan’s EEZ around the Ogasawara Islands) and the extremely 
extensive reclamation activities, there is also considerable concern about the environ-
mental impact of China in the SCS. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan have 
in the past all undertaken reclamation works on features occupied by them and built 
facilities. However, the current tensions arise from the incomparable scope and speed of 
China’s reclamation activities, the growing militarization of its controlled features, and 
the disputed compatibility of its claims and procedures with international maritime law. 
The general concern is that China will proceed in small steps (bu bu wei ying, 步步为营) 
which individually may not generate a strong reaction from other concerned countries, 
but will in the end create a “Chinese Lake” where the Freedom of Navigation (FON) and 
the economic interests of all other countries might be considerably diminished. This 
incremental process of China’s salami or cabbage tactic has also been referred to as dou er 
bu po (斗而不破): to struggle but without breaking (Lin 2015). 
3. Japan’s Interests in the South China Sea 
Japan’s interest in the South China Sea goes back to the 1920s, first starting with private 
businesses exploiting guano from some parts of the Spratly area, and ending with 
claiming sovereignty over the whole Spratly area after the occupation of Hainan in 
February 1939. As Tonnesson puts it, from 1942 to the beginning of 1945, the SCS was a 
Japanese lake (Tonnesson 2006: 16). But in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan 
renounced in Art. 2 (f) “all right, title, and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel 
Islands”. One interesting point of this renunciation is that the treaty does not say 
anything to whom the two island groups reverted which today absolves Japan from being 
bound by any territorial claim of the various disputants (Hara 2015: 48). 
After the Pacific War, Japan initially re-entered the region only economically through 
a succession of reparation treaties with several Southeast Asian countries which first led 
to a focus on extracting raw materials and energy, followed by building up manufacturing 
complexes which created a network economy. Japan’s security interest in the SCS area 
began with its concerns about the stability of ASEAN from the 1970s onwards (Vietnam 
War), followed by concerns about safe shipping through the Malacca Strait, and in the 
1990s with its concerns about piracy. The stability of the ASEAN member states has 
become of central importance for its geostrategic value and for Japan’s external trade. 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, 85%–90% of Japan’s oil imports (roughly 
75% of China’s oil imports), and 33% of Japan’s LNG imports pass through the sea lanes 
of communication (SLOC) of the SCS Africa (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2013: 3; Herberg 2016). Japanese war ships are passing regularly through the SCS, 
stopping often in Singapore, on their way to and from the anti-piracy operations on the 
east coast. 
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In the following I will analyse how the Japanese government is perceiving a link 
between the confrontation in the ECS – with its undetermined EEZ borders and the 
territorial dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands –, and the SCS. A 
further link explored is the extent to which these conflicts are related to Japan’s new 
security legislation and Prime Minister Abe’s concept of Japan to become a “Proactive 
Contributor to peace”. 
4. Interdependence of the Security in the South China Sea and the 
East China Sea 
Around 2009–2010, tensions started to rise in the SCS as well as in the ECS.5 While China 
became more assertive notably towards Vietnam and the Philippines, the Chinese fishing 
boat incident around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010 led to a severe crisis in 
Japanese-Chinese relations, followed by an even longer lasting fallout after the Japanese 
government’s purchase of three islands of the disputed ECS islands.6 The Japanese side 
could not fail to see here some parallel developments and concluded that standing up to 
Chinese assertiveness in the SCS and supporting in some way the other littoral states 
would be helpful in defending its stakes in the ECS.7 Moreover, the US became more 
outspoken in voicing its concern about the freedom of navigation and the necessity of a 
peaceful resolution of conflicting territorial claims in both seas. It was therefore in Japan’s 
interest to be seen as supporting the same principles in order to sustain US support for 
Japan in the ECS. Although the US does not take any position either on territorial claims 
by any claimants in either regions, it has reconfirmed several times, and President Obama 
was the first US President in April 2014 to do so, that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall 
under the security guarantee of Article 5 of the bilateral Japan-US Security Treaty.  
Another link for the current Japanese government between the SCS and the ECS is 
Prime Minister Abe’s policy of creating the political and constitutional environment to 
deepen security cooperation under the Japan-US security treaty and to enhance thus 
Japan’s security policy as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace”.8 The implementation of this 
security policy means concretely a greater Japanese involvement in international and 
notably regional security (e.g. slightly expanding Japan’s military budget, allowing the 
export of arms, reducing limits on Japanese contribution to UN peace keeping operations, 
etc.) as well as deepening Japan-US security cooperation. To this effect, the government 
has passed in 2015 thanks to its parliamentary majority several laws. In the parliamentary 
 
 
5  For the rise of tensions in the SCS see Pajon 2013: 10f. 
6  For a detailed analysis of these two crises see Drifte 2014. 
7  Lam Peng-Er argues that Japan has seen the two regions interrelated since China passed its “Law on 
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas” in 1992 which mentioned the disputed islands in the ECS as 
well as the SCS as integral part of China’s territory (Lam 1996: 1000). 
8  For an overview of these new security policies and legislative acts see Maslow 2015: 739ff. 
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discussion about the security laws of 2015, the government referred explicitly to the rising 
tensions in the ECS as well as SCS to justify the need for this new legislation.9  
Under Prime Minister Abe in particular, Japan has become increasingly outspoken 
about China as a challenge if not threat to Japan’s security, and the main reason for this 
concern is the perceived intention of China to change the territorial status quo by 
coercion not only in the ECS but also in the SCS. In December 2013, the new Abe 
government issued its first National Security Strategy which refers to the SCS as follows: 
“In the South China Sea in particular, disputes that have arisen over sovereignty between 
coastal states and China cause concern over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom 
of navigation, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In addition, vulnerability is also 
increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on 
which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources, due to various problems 
including regional conflicts and international terrorism in and around coastal states, as well as 
piracy.” (National Security Strategy 2013: 8f) 
And further on, the document says:  
“China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion 
based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international 
law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea.” (National Security Strategy 2013: 12) 
The security concerns of Japan regarding the SCS have increased with the huge 
reclamation work on some features which started in 2014. In June 2015, Defence Minister 
Nakatani Gen linked the SCS to Japan’s security concerns in the ECS by warning that the 
reclamation work could lead to an expanded Chinese military presence in the area which 
in turn might hinder US troops from coming to assist Japan in case of contingencies in 
the ECS.10 This security concern was reinforced by Nishi Masanori, former vice defence 
minister and now political adviser of Nakatani, warning that the creation of new islands 
has military purposes, including the instalment of radars and air defence missiles, and 
that China might declare an ADIZ over the SCS as it did in November 2013 over the 
ECS.11 This narrative of the ECS-SCS link has also led to the threat scenario by Defence 
Minister Nakatani that the continuous Chinese development of hydrocarbon resources in 
the ECS (i.e. the increase of platforms) in the as yet not demarcated EEZ might lead to 
China deploying a radar system or heliports.12 In August 2016 the Japanese government 
reported that the Chinese side had installed radar on one of the 16 gas drilling platforms 
 
 
9 Giulio Pugliese has described the close link between Abe’s security laws in 2015 and the tensions in the 
SCS and the ECS: Pugliese 2016: 102f. 
10  NHK, 9 June 2015 (the articles quoted from the website NHK are no longer accessible but available from 
the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
11 Japan Times, Japanese Official Warns that South China Sea Activities May Be Precursor to ADIZ, 15 
December 2015, http://bit.ly/29ta1yY. 
12  Mainichi Shimbun, 24 July 2015 (the articles quoted from the website Mainichi Shimbun are no longer 
accessible but available from the author; the date of the article is the dates of access). For a critical view of 
this scenario see Panda 2015. 
Japan’s Policy towards the South China Sea 7 
 
 
in the contested area of the ECS.13 The Chinese side explained this infrared radar as 
necessary for the safety of the platform, apart from refuting any right by Japan to 
intervene in waters under Chinese jurisdiction.14 
Concern about the security implications of China’s reclamation work prompted 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party parliamentarians to insist that the 2015 White 
Paper of Japan’s Defence was to include aerial photographs of China’s island-building in 
the SCS as well as Chinese oil and gas platforms in the ECS.15 As a result the White Paper 
included photos of the reclamation on Johnson South Reef and the Subi Reef.16 
Prime Minister Abe outlined three principles for his understanding of the rule of law: 
“The first principle is that states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law. 
The second is that states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims. The third 
principle is that states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means.” (Abe 2014) 
To spread this narrative of the rule of law and to press its interpretation of the law of the 
sea, the Japanese government has been striving to include references to it in the 
statements made at the end of international meetings like the G7. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs organised in 2014 and 2015 international conferences on the law of the sea in both 
the ECS and SCS regions.17 The government is also supporting the arbitration award by 
the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as the Arbitral Tribunal) of 12 
July 2016 and calls for the adherence by both parties, the Philippines as well as China: 
“2. Japan has consistently advocated the importance of the rule of law and the use of peaceful 
means, not the use of force or coercion, in seeking settlement of maritime disputes. 
3. As the Tribunal’s award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute under the 
provisions of UNCLOS, the parties to this case are required to comply with the award. Japan 
strongly expects that the parties’ compliance with this award will eventually lead to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 July 2016) 
Although China does not tire to state that its increasing security role and notably the huge 
reclamation work in the SCS have no negative consequences for the Freedom of 
Navigation, it is obvious that to Japan’s policymakers and observers, but also to those of 
 
 
13  Japan Times, 7 August 2016, http://bit.ly/29ta1yY. 
14  NHK, 9 August 2016 (the articles quoted from the website NHK are no longer accessible but available 
from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
15  LDP Defence Committee delays approval of Defence White Paper because “Description of China’s moves 
are insufficient” (Jiminto Kokubo Bukai [Chugoku no ugoki ni kansuru kijutsu ga fujubun] to Boei 
Hakusho no ryosho miokuri), Sankei Shimbun, 7 July 2015, http://bit.ly/2dx668i. 
16  Thanks to Giulio Pugliese I discovered that originally six photos of these reefs appeared in the first version 
of the White Paper which is now only retrievable through a web archive site (http://bit.ly/2cLdlco, p. 6), 
but the currently available website of the Ministry of Defense has only two photos of Fiery Cross Reef in 
2014 and in 2015, in: Ministry of Defense (Japan) 2015: 47. 
17  For relevant documents of the conferences in 2016 and 2015 see http://bit.ly/2d1ZS25 and 
http://bit.ly/2cpvL5L. 
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other countries, the experience of China’s escalating steps in the ECS and its opposition to 
international arbitration is rather worrying. The Singaporean defence minister in June 
2016 summoned up the concerns of many regional players when he stated: 
“[…] the Chinese has (sic) assured the freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight. But no 
responsible government can approach this on the basis that ‘Let’s hope that nothing happens 
even though the tensions are up.’ So we do pay attention to it.”18 
As we have seen above, the Japanese government’s narrative of linking China’s SCS and 
ECS activities has certainly contributed to a hardening of Tokyo’s perception of these 
activities, but its SCS countermeasures go beyond “paying attention” as we will see in the 
last three parts of this report. 
5. Japan and the Natural Resources of the South China Sea 
The main natural resources in the SCS of interest to Japan are fishing and energy 
resources. As a major consumer of fish, the SCS’s fishing resources are a considerable 
economic interest for Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government is very well aware of the 
importance of fishing resources for the countries around the SCS. Most of Japan’s fishing 
resources from the SCS seem to be imported from the littoral countries, including from 
Chinese fishing companies operating in the SCS, rather than acquired through its own 
fishing fleet (Gang 2016). When China imposed unilateral fishing rules in the SCS 
through the prefectural government of Hainan (according to official position Hainan is in 
charge of administering the SCS), the Japanese government protested in January 2014.19 
More important economic interests are related to Japan’s involvement in the off-shore 
(as well as on-shore) prospection and extraction of oil and gas resources in the SCS region 
in order to pursue the goal of diversification of supply of hydrocarbon as well as the 
marketing of Japan’s high technology services in the energy sector. These energy interests 
have so far not found any attention in the limited English language literature on Japan’s 
policy towards the SCS.20 However, some of the off-shore oil and gas blocks put out to 
tender by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia lie within China’s 
geographically ill-defined (no coordinates provided) and politically ambiguous (does it 
mark territorial waters, EEZ borders, or traditional fishing areas?) 10-dash line which 
overlaps with the EEZs and continental shelves claimed by these littoral countries.21 
Prospection and exploitation by Japanese energy companies (including also by 
 
 
18  Kyodo, 30 June 2016 (the articles quoted from the website of Kyodo are no longer accessible but available 
from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
19  Kyodo, 17 January 2014 (the articles quoted from the website of Kyodo are no longer accessible but 
available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
20  See e.g. Pajon 2013; Midford 2015; Pugliese 2016. 
21  For a Chinese point of view concerning China’s rights to all oil and gas resources within the 10-dash line 
see Li Guoqiang 2015. 
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Vietnamese and other international companies) in the contested waters between Vietnam 
and China and between the Philippines and China (no Japanese involvement in the latter) 
are the only cases which have so far been targeted by Chinese protests. However, China’s 
growing political and military assertiveness in the SCS may lead to a stronger response in 
the future. As Li Guoqiang, a senior researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
put it in the journal of the Chinese International Institute for International Studies, the 
think tank of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
“Since the 1970s, China’s neighboring countries in the South China Sea region have signed 428 
cooperative agreements with third party oil companies in the South China Sea, with 188 of these 
agreements being partially or totally within China’s dotted line. As a result, the equivalent of 5,000 
tons of oil have been plundered from China’s dotted line every year. This trend is unabatedly 
gaining momentum.” (Li Guoqiang 2015: 10) 
Map of some oil/gas fields involving Japanese companies within or near China’s 10-
dash line22: 
 
 
22  Based on the map provided by d-maps.com (www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=32143&lang=de) 
adapted by Peter Kreuzer. 
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In the case of Vietnam, Japan reached an agreement as early as 1978 about the 
development of hydrocarbon resources in the SCS and in July 1994, Vietnam ratified 
UNCLOS (before China or Japan did so!) which entitles states with sea borders to an EEZ 
and – according to topographical circumstances – to a continental shelf. However, 
according to leaked US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, China pressured 
international oil companies as early as 2006 not to sign exploration contracts with Vietnam. 
These companies included Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, ConocoPhillips, British Petroleum (BP), 
Malaysia’s Petronas but also Idemitsu Oil & Gas Corp. from Japan. All were told that such 
contracts would violate China’s sovereignty (Simon 2012: 1001f).23 Still, Japanese companies 
and those of other countries are still active in the contested sea areas. The following 
blocks/fields which had/have Japanese companies involved are either close to or clearly 
within China’s ill-defined 10-dash line as can be seen on the online IHS map24: 
Block 122: Mitsui Oil Exploration Co (MOEC) 2006–2012 (2007 PRC) protest against 
Chevron (Do Thanh Hai 2014: 98). 
Block 04/3: Idemitsu Oil & Gas Co. until 2007; from 2014: a Japanese bank involved in 
a multilateral loan consortium (led by the Taiwanese Bank Cathay United Bank!) for 
pipeline construction from several gas fields, including Block 04/3, to Vung Tao 
(Vietnam mainland).25 
Block 05-1b&c (Daihung field): Idemitsu Oil & Gas Co in 2005 established Production 
Sharing Contract with JX Nippon Oil Exploration (now JX Nippon Oil & Gas 
Exploration) and Teikoku Oil Co. and Petrovietnam (PRC protest in 2007). Ongoing 
(Energy Key Facts 2015: 16). 
Block 05-2, 05-3: Idemitsu Oil & Gas Co. sold out in 2007 because of PRC pressure on 
the majority shareholder BP; contract in 2015 between Rosneft (Russia) and Japan 
Drilling Corp. to deploy “Hakuryu 5”, a semi sub, for exploration drilling in Block 05-
3/11 and Block 06-1.26 
In the case of Indonesia, it is the prospection and production of hydrocarbon resources in 
the area of the Natuna Islands (belonging to the Riau province of Indonesia) which may 
give rise to problems with China. One of Indonesia’s biggest gas field in the area, D-Alpha 
Block, is clearly within China’s 10-dash line. Until now it seems that the PRC has not 
publicly protested any Indonesian hydrocarbon activities there, but Beijing’s position 
regarding Indonesia’s EEZ claim around the Natuna Islands which partly overlaps with 
the 10-dash line is rather ambiguous. The Indonesian government does not recognise 
China’s ten-dash line as having any international legal basis (Jayakumar et al. 2014: 148). 
 
 
23  For more information on these Chinese protests see Do Thanh Hai 2014: 98; Tran Truong Thuy 2011. 
24  For the IHS map of all the blocks along the Vietnamese coast and their geographic relation to the 10-dash 
line see: http://files.hoangsa.net/Downloads/12866-vn06e2gen.pdf (the link is no longer accessible but 
available from the author). 
25  Talk Vietnam.Com, Vietsovpetro Presses on Despite Price Slump, 2 July 2014, http://bit.ly/2cF0czT. 
26  www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/040920155.html 
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Although China as well as Indonesia officially proclaim that there is no territorial conflict, 
Chinese authorities intervened forcefully in 2016 when Indonesian authorities arrested 
Chinese fishermen in the Natuna area, claiming “traditional fishing rights”. It is unclear 
whether that will also extend to hydrocarbon resources. The following Japanese 
companies are involved in Indonesian blocks which seem to be inside the 10-dash line: 
Tuna Block: MOEC has a 20% share.27 
South Natuna Sea Block B (South & North Belut): INPEX has a share of 35%.28 
In the case of Malaysia and Brunei, Japanese companies are involved in the following 
blocks which are north of the island of Borneo and clearly within the 10-dash line which 
runs rather close to the northern coast of the island:  
Deep Water Block R: JX Nippon Oil & Gas exploration.29 
Deep Water Block S: JOGMEC provides equity financing to INPEX Offshore North 
West Sabah Ltd (Offshore Energy Today 2015). 
Gas Fields of Serai, Saderi, Jintan, SK8, Bijan, Cilipadi, Helang, Layang: JX Nippon 
Oil & Gas involved in exploration with other Japanese partners. 30  Moreover, 
Mitsubishi and Nippon Oil are participating in three on-shore LNG complexes (Satu, 
Dua and Tiga) which get their gas from fields within China’s claimed sea area.31 In 
2006, the Tiga LNG complex signed a 25-year contract to supply LNG to Shanghai.32 
Thus in effect Japan is involved in supplying gas from a Malaysian field inside the 10-
dash line! 
Japanese companies are heavily involved in the on-shore gas production of Brunei. 
Off-shore, Mitsubishi has a share of 6.25% in the Block CA2 (Gas) which is most likely 
overlapping with China’s 10-dash line.33 
Apart from protests about Vietnamese and Philippine oil and gas fields, China has not 
officially protested the activities of non-Chinese companies in SCS off-shore fields which 
are within the 10-dash line despite the complaints in some official literature (Li Guoqiang 
2015). In the case of Malaysia, China is even one of the main buyers of the gas produced 
within the 10-dash line area (Kreuzer 2015: 9).34 It is obvious that the Chinese govern-
ment does not yet consider the time having come to clarify the exact coordinates and 
 
 
27  www.moeco.com.jp/en/project/asia.html. 
28  www.inpex.co.jp/english/business/indonesia.html. 
29  www.nex.jx-group.co.jp/english/activity/southeast_asia/malaysia_map01.html. 
30  www.nex.jx-group.co.jp/english/activity/southeast_asia/malaysia.html. 
31  Email from Peter Kreuzer 13 June 2016. 
32  http://bit.ly/29JK5RB; http://bit.ly/29JK5RB. 
33  http://bit.ly/29sMz5L. 
34  For an interesting interpretation of China’s motives to treat the littoral SCS states differently see Kreuzer 
2015. 
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political meaning of the 10-dash line and to intervene against foreign companies. On the 
other hand, the littoral countries take care to have the world’s biggest energy companies 
involved and/or to spread their geographic provenance (e.g. US, Russia, and India) when 
exploiting the energy resources in the SCS. 
The involvement of Japanese companies is, as we have seen, of a relatively modest 
scale, focusing on exploration and operating as part of joint ventures with bigger 
companies. With China’s growing military posture in the SCS, its improved technology, 
its increasing energy consumption (e.g. the preference for the use of natural gas as a less 
polluting alternative to coal) and the increasing dependence of the littoral countries on 
China, however, Beijing may one day decide to move more resolutely against some of the 
littoral countries encroaching on what it considers to be its resources as is clearly spelled 
out in Li Guoqiang’s article. This is already the case concerning fishing rights within the 
10-dash line as is demonstrated by the increasing number of fishing incidents not only 
with Vietnam and the Philippines, but now also with Malaysia and Indonesia which so far 
had been eager to play down any friction with China and which are now more 
aggressively asserting fishing rights against what they consider illegal fishing in their 
waters by not only China but also other littoral countries (Cochrane 2016).35 If China 
changes tack, Japan may become a target of Chinese countermeasures, either as a 
retribution for Japan’s SCS policy and/or warning to Japan regarding the conflict in the 
ECS. Some of these Japanese explorations have Japanese government backing, e.g. by the 
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) which is under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Any Chinese 
pressure on this company would therefore directly involve the Japanese government. 
6. Japan’s Political and Economic Support of the Littoral South 
China Sea Countries 
Japan has traditionally supported the littoral states of the SCS as part of its policy to 
strengthen the political and economic resilience and cooperation of ASEAN. As 
important markets, sources for raw materials and destination of Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), the littoral states of the SCS and the members of ASEAN in general 
have been and continue to be major recipients of Japanese ODA (Official Development 
Assistance), be it loans, grants or technical aid. Particularly under Prime Minister Abe, 
the ASEAN members have become an important part of Japan’s new “minilateral” 
security partnerships. As John Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara Kiichi point out, the focus 
on ASEAN members stands out as is e.g. seen in the frequency of Abe’s overseas visits: 
 
 
35 South China Morning Post, Philippines Detains Chinese, Vietnamese Fishermen for Suspected Poaching, 
17 May 2016, http://bit.ly/1Xx0lZg; Kyodo, 29 March 2016 (the articles quoted from the website of Kyodo 
are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
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“While the US and Australia can provide the muscle in terms of military hardware and alliance 
support to deter China, ASEAN provides critical political support and legitimacy to Japan’s efforts 
to balance against China’s rise.” (Nilsson-Wright/Fujiwara 2015: 9) 
From 1960 to 2011 Japan provided 35% of global ODA going to the ASEAN countries. In 
the case of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, Japan is the no. 1 ODA 
donor among all the member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the OECD. The Philippines as a crucial littoral state is particularly benefiting from 
Tokyo’s largesse: In 2015, Japan provided to the Philippines a loan of roughly $2 billion to 
build a railway line which is the single largest ODA commitment by Japan to an overseas 
development partner. Moreover, this railway project was originally to be financed by 
China but the Philippine senate cancelled it amidst corruption charges (Nonato 2015). 
Amount of DAC Countries’ and International Organizations’ Gross ODA 
Disbursements (in billion $)36 
 Vietnam Philippines Malaysia Indonesia 
2009 1,414 0,684 0,240 1,415 
2010 1,117 0,686 0,143 1,593 
2011 1,368 0,414 0,198 1,030 
2012 2,035 0,436 0,208 0,822 
2013 1,680 0,256 0,144 0,968 
 
With Japan’s slow move to maritime awareness, security considerations have become 
more prominent in its ODA policy. In February 2015, the Japanese government revised 
for the first time since 2003 the Development Cooperation Charter which is to help Japan 
make a “proactive contribution to the peace, stability and prosperity” of the world and 
now allows the use of ODA to protect its national interests in view of changing global 
environment which was clearly also inspired by the rising tensions in the SCS. In the 
ODA White Paper published in 2016, mention was made of strengthening the rule of law, 
maritime security, cybersecurity and peace-building measures (Mie/Johnson 2016; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015: 132). 
Precursor to Japan’s current security support of the littoral SCS states are its past 
efforts to establish mechanisms for regional cooperation which contribute to the safety of 
shipping as well as regional stability. In consideration of Japan’s past aggression in the 
region as well as Japan’s constitutional restraints, these efforts were initially embedded in 
multilateral frameworks and devoid of military security aspects. The earliest example is 
the safety of the Malacca Strait through which most of Japan’s oil from the Middle East 
passes. Japan was instrumental in establishing the Malacca Straits Council in July 1968 
and in funding its operations. Japan was also an initiator of what became in 1994 the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, the first Southeast Asian government institution to discuss 
 
 
36  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 2016: Japan’s ODA Data by Country, http://bit.ly/2d30JhM. 
14 Reinhard Drifte 
 
 
security issues (Midford 2015: 530). Japan supported also ASEAN’s efforts for the 2002 
Declaration on Conduct in the SCS. However, despite strong Japanese backing, a binding 
Code of Conduct for the SCS has still not been concluded mainly due to Chinese foot-
dragging and ASEAN’s disunity. As a result of the increase of piracy and armed robbery 
in the SCS area, Japan became since 2000 a sponsor of regional responses to this problem 
and provided capacity building, technical assistance and equipment. These efforts finally 
led to the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the establishment in September 2006 of the 
ReCAAP Information Sharing Center in Singapore of which Japan is after Singapore the 
largest financial supporter (Midford 2015: 534).  
Piracy is still a major concern for Japan as well as all other nations which use the sea 
lanes of communication in the SCS. According to the International Maritime Bureau’s 
(IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre, piracy, including attempted theft and hijackings, 
continues to be a threat to tankers in the Strait of Malacca. In 2008 alone, there were 13 
actual attacks on vessels underway in southern area of South China Sea. According to 
latest data published by IMB, in 2010, there were in total 36 actual and attempted attacks 
in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore Straits and South China Sea. This number rose 
substantially to 44 in 2011 and 90 in 2014 respectively according to the latest statistics 
published by ReCAAP ISC Annual Report. Piracy and armed robbery hence still remain a 
big threat (Chen/Xu 2015: 6). 
In November 2011 at the East Asian Summit in Bali, the then Prime Minister Noda 
proposed the expansion of the ASEAN Maritime Forum to more members, including the 
US. In 2012 ASEAN expanded the Forum which now includes the members of the East 
Asian Summit (Midford 2015: 538). This 1.5-track dialogue discusses the issue of 
conflicting claims in the region, the relevance of UNCLOS for maritime security, 
maritime connectivity and capacity building in infrastructure and equipment (Pajon 
2013: 17). Another regional forum supported by Japan is the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM) which has also expanded to include extra-regional members as 
dialogue partners (ADMM+). All these fora include now China as well and it is the hope 
not only of Japan that this will help to “socialize” China and better acquaint it with 
international norms and rules.  
Following up from a proposal made by Prime Minister Abe in May 2014, the 
government started to organise seminars on capacity building in maritime security for 
defence and foreign affairs officials from ASEAN countries. These seminars aim to 
explain Japan’s new security legislation, the government’s maritime security assistance to 
ASEAN and the defence technologies relevant to maritime security produced in Japan 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 16 December 2015).  
It is obvious that Japan’s multilateral efforts and encouragements have also become 
part of the larger Japan-China rivalry which is particularly visible when it comes to 
shaping economic regionalism. China has been faster than Japan in concluding bilateral 
FTAs with individual ASEAN member states as well as with ASEAN as a whole. Japan is 
promoting a more open regionalism whereas China prefers to focus on Asian countries 
and tries to exclude the US. Japan aims at more comprehensive so-called Economic 
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Partnership Agreements whereas China concludes FTAs without dispute settlement 
mechanisms and more exclusions of sensitive items. The latest battleground for this 
Japan-China competition is the Chinese proposal for the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) of which Japan – in contrast to many Western countries except the US – has 
not yet become a member while establishing at the same time its own Partnership for 
Quality Infrastructure which is also to compete with China’s wider One Belt One Road 
project (Mazza 2015). 
7. Bilateral Efforts and the Role of the Japanese Coast Guard 
The support of multilateral efforts concerns only very issue-specific measures (safety of 
navigation; piracy) and is less effective in addressing the most important issue of 
opposing territorial claims, or the connected issues of China’s military buildup and its 
huge reclamation efforts. China is adamantly opposed to discussing the territorial dispute 
on a multilateral level. While delaying any progress towards a binding Code of Conduct, 
China continues with its hydrocarbon prospection, military expansion, reclamation and 
occupation of maritime feature in the SCS. Moreover, ASEAN is not speaking with one 
voice and it is easy for China to lean on weaker states such as Cambodia or Laos to 
prevent any deeper discussion of the SCS in the above-mentioned fora and meetings.   
Celine Pajon expressed therefore a wide-spread feeling in Japan, the region as well as 
other Western countries about the lack of progress despite many fora and dialogues in 
ASEAN: 
“Nothing of real consequence emanates from these arrangements and such consensus-based settings 
tend to be rather counter-productive on the long run. They may give pre-eminence to reluctant 
players and give birth to only bottom-line agreements.” (Pajon 2013: 14) 
The Japanese government has therefore started already under the Noda administration to 
put greater emphasis on helping the more vocal SCS littoral states with their coast guard 
and military capacity and what is nowadays referred to as “maritime domain 
awareness”.37 This enhanced security cooperation entails a stronger defence diplomacy, 
the use of ODA for coast guards, and naval support. Between 1995 and 2011 already, JICA 
received the greatest number of trainees for its coast guard training programme from four 
S.E. Asian countries: Philippines (90), Indonesia (86), Malaysia (70) and Vietnam (27) 
(JICA’s World 2013: 5). At the centre are Vietnam and the Philippines which take the 
strongest position against Chinese territorial claims. Indonesia as the largest state among 
ASEAN is also targeted, but Jakarta – particularly under the new president Joko Widodo 
– is much more aloof and has only recently become more willing to publicly confront 
China on its SCS policies regarding fishing (Cochrane 2016).  
 
 
37  This term is defined by the International Maritime Organisation as follows: “The effective understanding 
of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact upon the security, safety, 
economy or environment.”, www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29093&filename=1367.pdf. 
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Since Fiscal Year 2012, the Japanese Ministry of Defence runs the Capacity Building 
Support programme for nine Asia-Pacific countries which includes the littoral countries 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Initially it focused on providing 
technological assistance for road construction and vehicle maintenance, but since China 
declared its new ADIZ in the ECS in November 2013, it also includes the organisation of 
seminars on aviation security and the international aviation laws for senior military 
officials for the littoral countries (Sonoyama 2015). 
With the passage of the security laws in September 2015, Japan’s military forces were 
authorized for the first time to come to the assistance of countries under attack if those 
attacks also threaten Japan. When debating the legislation in 2014, Prime Minister Abe 
declared in the Japanese parliament that sending Japan’s military to exercise collective 
self-defense right, when a military conflict occurs in the South China Sea, would depend 
on the situation but as of now he did not deem existing territorial disputes between China 
and Southeast Asian countries as cases where the new rules could be applied.38 
7.1 Philippines 
The bilateral security relationship with the Philippines is currently the most advanced 
although it is not yet clear whether the new president Rodrigo Duterte will continue the 
strong stance on the SCS against China taken by his predecessor Benigno Aquino and 
how he will operationalise the outcome of the Philippine-initiated court case against 
China before the Arbitral Tribunal. Already in September 2011, Japan and the Philippines 
elevated their bilateral relationship to a “Strategic Partnership” which was further elevated 
to a “Strengthened Strategic Partnership” at the latest summit meeting in June 2015. The 
Action Plan to implement this new relationship envisages the conclusion of an agreement 
on the transfer of defence equipment and technology, expansion of bilateral and 
multilateral trainings and exercises for capacity building of the Philippine armed forces, 
and acquisition of patrol boats for the Coast Guard (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 June 
2015). At a press conference during his visit to Manila in June 2013, Defence Minister 
Onodera Itsunori expressed very clearly Japan’s strategic support as well as his perception 
of the linkage between the SCS and the ECS disputes: 
“We agreed that we will further co-operate in terms of the defense of remote islands […] the defense 
of territorial seas as well as protection of maritime interests […] We face a very similar situation in 
the East China Sea of Japan. The Japan side is very concerned that this kind of situation in the South 
China Sea could affect the situation in the East China Sea.”39 
 
 
38  Jiji Press, 15 July 2014 (the articles quoted from the website of Jiji Press are no longer accessible but 
available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
39  Japan Today, Japan Vows to Help Philippines in China Sea Dispute, 28 June 2013 (the articles quoted 
from the website of Japan Today are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the 
articles are the dates of access). 
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In the meantime, summit meetings and visits by other government officials, notably of 
the Self Defence Forces have increased. In January 2015 a memorandum on “Defence 
Cooperation and Exchanges” was signed between both ministries of defence (Ministry of 
Defense 29 January 2015). At the summit meeting in June 2015, the two sides agreed to 
start talks on the sale of Japanese defence equipment to Manila and an agreement was 
signed in February 2016 (Cruz de Castro 2016).40 Tokyo promised already in July 2013 
the delivery of 10 patrol boats for the Philippine coast guard through a loan agreement 
which will use ODA funds. President Aquino had stated that the US as well as Japan will 
be given access to the Subic naval base. However, the delivery of the ships has been 
considerably delayed because of construction delays and the own needs of the Japanese 
coast guard for ECS patrols. Whereas there was talk of 12 ships in 2012 (as the Philippines 
had requested), the number is now down to 10.41 In February 2016 a keel laying ceremony 
was held in Yokohama and the first vessel referred to as multi-role response vessels 
(MRRV) is to be delivered to the Philippine coast guard in September 2016 (Desiderio 
2016). In May 2016 Japan decided to lease up to five TC-90 military training aircraft to 
the Philippine military to patrol the SCS, including training pilots and aircraft mechanics. 
The TC-90 is capable of flying some 1,900 kilometres (1,180 miles), roughly double the 
flight range of the Philippine navy’s aircraft.42 
Finally, mutual visits and joint military exercises are increasing. In October 2014, four 
SDF officers had observer status for the first time in a joint Philippine-US combat 
training exercise (PHIBLEX) that simulated seizing an island under attack by enemy 
forces.43 In the past, Japan and the Philippines had started to engage in disaster and relief 
exercises. In 2015 alone there were two such disaster relief exercises between the two 
countries, one in June which involved a P3-C of the Maritime Self-Defense (MSDF) and 
which took place 140 km northwest of Palawan in the SCS Cruz de Castro 2016). It was 
noticed in the press that the P3-C flight was near or possibly over the Reed Bank which is 
claimed by China and the Philippines.44 Most recently, in April 2016, three MSDF vessels, 
 
 
40  Asahi Shimbun, Japan, Philippines to Step up Security Ties to Deter Chinese Expansionism, 5 June 2015 
(the articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the 
author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
41  Yomiuri Shimbun, Beef up Maritime Security by Boosting Aid to S.E. Asia, 7 April 2012 (the articles 
quoted from the website of Yomiuri Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the author; all 
dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
42  Asian Times, Japan Agrees to Lease Five TC-90 Military Training Aircraft to Philippines, 3 May 2016 (the 
articles quoted from the website of Asian Times are no longer accessible but available from the author; all 
dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
43 Asahi Shimbun, SDF Observes Island Defense Exercise in Philippines, Aimed at Countering China, 3 
October 2015 (the articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer accessible but 
available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
44  Japan Times, Japan, Philippines Hail Second Day of Joint Drills in South China Sea, 24 June 2015 (the 
articles quoted from the website of Japan Times are no longer accessible but available from the author; all 
dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
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two destroyers and a submarine, visited Subic Bay, the former American base in the 
Philippines, and conducted exercises with its Philippine counterpart.45 
7.2 Vietnam 
Security relations with Vietnam have also shown a rapid increase despite Vietnam’s 
communist regime and its cautious balancing acts in its troubled relationship with China. 
In contrast to the Philippines, China takes a more lenient position on Vietnam which tries 
to juggle relations with all the great powers.46 There is an intensive Japan-Vietnam high-
level exchange of political leaders: In 2013, Abe chose Vietnam as his first destination for 
an overseas trip. In September 2013, Defence Minister Onodera Itsunori was the first 
foreign defence official to be invited to visit the former Soviet Cam Ranh Bay base. 
Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang paid a visit to Japan in 2014 as a state guest. 
During the latter encounter, the two countries agreed to upgrade the existing “Strategic 
Partnership” to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”. In 
September 2015 Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong visited Japan. There exists 
now a Strategic Partnership Dialogue at the vice-foreign minister level and other foreign 
policy-related fora. In May 2015, the Air Self-Defense (ASDF) Chief of Staff Gen. 
Harukazu Saito met Senior Lt. Gen. Do Ba Ty, chief of the general staff of the People’s 
Army of Vietnam and vice minister of national defence, in Hanoi. In October 2015 both 
sides agreed on a visit by the Maritime Self-Defense (MSDF) in Cam Ranh Bay which 
Tokyo wants to use in future more often as a stop-over port on the way to the anti-piracy 
operation off the African east coast (Collin 7 October 2015). The first MSDF ships made 
port calls in April and again in May 2016 (Sasaki 2016). 
In addition Japan is helping Vietnam to build up its maritime law enforcement 
agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 18 March 2014). Japan promised Vietnam already in 
2014 to donate six second-hand patrol boats, two of which were formerly in the service of 
the Japanese Fisheries Agency. After overcoming various delays, the first modified boat 
was finally delivered in August 2015, followed by the second one in September (Collin 7 
October 2015; Kameda 2015).47 
7.3 Malaysia and Indonesia 
With Malaysia, Japan has only since 2015 a Strategic Partnership but is also helping the 
country with capacity building of its coast guard, the Maritime Enforcement Agency 
 
 
45 The Yomiuri Shimbun, MSDF Vessels Call at South China Sea Ports, 4 April 2016 (the articles quoted 
from the website of Yomiuri Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of 
the articles are the dates of access). 
46  See for example Luo 2015. 
47  Japan Times, Abe’ Hollow Diplomacy, 5 August 2014 (the articles quoted from the website of Japan Times 
are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 25 May 2015). A memorandum of cooperation between their 
ministries of defence is pending with plans for the sale of defence equipment. The security 
relationship may become closer as Malaysia has started to react more strongly to the 
presence of Chinese coast guard vessels around various SCS features which are claimed by 
Malaysia, and with disputes over Chinese fishing in what Malaysia claims to be its EEZ.48  
Indonesia as the most populous country with its regional leadership ambitions is a key 
country for Japan’s South East Asia policy, be it politically, economically or militarily. 
Although officially, as we have seen above, Indonesia and China assert that they do not 
have a territorial dispute in the SCS and China recognizes Indonesia’s sovereignty over 
the Natuna Islands which is in the proximity of the 10-dash line, the Indonesian 
government does not recognise the legality of the 10-dash line and disputes China’s 
claims for “historical rights” of fishing in what Indonesia claims is its EEZ which partly 
overlaps with China’s line (Cochrane 2016). Against this background and Japan’s and 
Indonesia’s common interest in anti-piracy, Japan has been providing concrete support 
for Indonesia for some time. Already in 2007, Japan offered Indonesia three patrol vessels, 
each newly built and measuring 27 meters, under a bilateral agreement that they would be 
used exclusively against pirates in the Strait of Malacca, terrorists, smugglers and other 
criminal elements at sea. In this way, Japan could use ODA funds which originally could 
not be used for security purposes.49 In 2006 a Strategic Partnership was agreed between 
both countries. In March 2015, a memorandum was signed between both ministries of 
defence on “cooperation and exchanges in the field of defence” (Ministry of Defense 23 
March 2015; Pajon 2013: 22). In the same month, the summit meeting between Prime 
Minister Abe and President Joko Widodo resulted in a joint statement which was 
interestingly titled “Towards further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership 
Underpinned by Sea and Democracy” which responded to Indonesia’s new emphasis on 
its surrounding sea as well as Abe’s interest in the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the 
basis of international law. On the same occasion the relationship was upgraded to the 
level of “Strategic Partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 March 2015). In December 
2015, Japan established “two-plus-two” security talks with Indonesia, the first such forum 
with a member of ASEAN, and both sides agreed at its first meeting to start negotiations 
on an agreement to transfer defence equipment and technology (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 18 December 2015). In March 2016 it was decided to send SDF and Coast Guard 
personnel to Indonesia to help enhance the country’s naval capabilities.50 
 
 
48  On Malaysia’s territorial claims see Vuving 2016. On Malaysia cautious position towards China see 
Kreuzer 2015. Concerning fishing disputes with China see Malay Mail Online, Minister Assures Presence 
of Chinese Coast Guard Ships on Sarawak Waters Under Control, 13 February 2016, http://bit.ly/29sOeIe. 
49  Asahi Shimbun, Japan Coast Guard Vessels and Equipment in High Demand in S.E. Asia, Africa, 30 
September 2013 (the articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer accessible but 
available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
50  NHK, Self-Defense Forces to Support Indonesian Navy, 14 March 2016 (the articles quoted from the 
website of NHK are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the 
dates of access). 
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7.4  Cooperation with Australia and India 
Although neither country is a SCS littoral country nor is supporting any territorial claim 
in the SCS, the increasing defence cooperation between on the one hand Australia and 
India and Japan on the other is very much motivated by a joint interest in the security of 
the SCS. At the same time the US is a strong security partner of Australia and Japan, 
wanting to involve both on its side in the SCS. As we will see in the following, one main 
US objective is to somehow involve all three partners in some kind of air and/or sea 
patrols. India has more recently become associated with some of the efforts of these three 
countries to maintain stability in the SCS in the face of China’s assertiveness. As a result 
we can observe bilateral, trilateral (Japan, Australia, US) as well as quadrilateral (Japan, 
Australia, US, India) security cooperation which often related to SCS issues (O’Rourke 
2016). 
Since 2002, Japan has held with Australia and the US ministerial meetings, and since 
the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, there has been a 
qualitative and quantitative expansion of defence links, annual meetings between foreign 
and defence ministers, and deepened military cooperation. The 2010 Japan-Australia 
Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement and Information Security Agreement gave 
the bilateral security relationship an even deeper legal and institutional foundation, 
followed in July 2014 by the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment 
and Technology (Liff 2016: 22; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8 July 2014). The security of 
and the Freedom of Navigation in the SCS is an important issue in all fora and 
institutional links and is bound to become even more topical. However, at the same time 
Australia has considerable political and economic interests in a smooth relationship with 
China which will restrain Australian support for Japan’s role in the SCS.51  
8. Japan-US: Japan as “Assistant Balancer”? 
The increased Japanese involvement in the security of the SCS has been very much 
promoted by the US through various new bilateral defence policy agreements. In a joint 
vision statement on 28 April 2015, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe, when referring to the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, said that 
both countries will “work more closely on issues including maritime security, and to 
partner with other countries that share our aspirations, in the region and beyond”.52 
These new guidelines issued on April 27, 2015, mentioned that both countries will 
cooperate on maritime security and “Partner Capacity Building” (Ministry of Defense 27 
April 2015). A key slogan used in this document is “enhancement of maritime domain 
awareness”. 
 
 
51  For a discussion of these conflicting interests see Walton 2016. 
52  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement, 28 April 2015, 
http://bit.ly/2cte9CV. 
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In order to deter China from coercing the other disputants to concede to its demands, 
the US has enhanced its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) since 2015.53 
China features as an object of annual US FONOPs since 2007, but was only targeted once 
between 1997and 2006.54 In its quest to achieve more burden sharing with its security 
partners and allies in the region, several US officials have mentioned the desirability of 
Japan to participate in naval or maritime patrols in the SCS: In January 2015, Vice 
Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, welcomed Japanese air patrols 
(Kelly/Kubo 2015). In June 2015, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the US Pacific 
Fleet, gave a cautious and indirect welcome to such an idea by saying “I welcome the 
opportunity to work closely with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ships and aircraft 
and the Air Self-Defense Force aircraft, throughout the region”.55 So far the Japanese 
government has been cautiously welcoming the US position and expressed the intention 
to consider the dispatch of the SDF. Defence Minister Nakatani Gen declared in the 
Japanese Diet in August 2015 that joint Japan-US surveillance in the SCS should be 
considered under Japan’s new security laws.56 His comment was made when a leaked 
internal document of his ministry suggested that Japan should consider providing 
support to US forces in the SCS.57 Earlier Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of the Joint Staff of 
the SDF, said in an interview to the Wall Street Journal “We don’t have any plans to 
conduct surveillance in the South China Sea currently but depending on the situation, I 
think there is a chance we could consider doing so”.58 At his meeting with Obama on 19 
November 2015 in Manila, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed strong support 
for the US position in the South China Sea and stated that his government would consider 
dispatching the Japan Self-Defense Forces to the South China Sea.59 
These above remarks were eagerly taken up by some media outlets, but they seem to 
have been more a warning to China not to go too far. Such regional air or maritime patrol 
missions seem for the time being a remote prospect since they would require a much 
 
 
53  For an American position on this issue see Odom 2016. 
54  Email from Peter Kreuzer, 6 July 2016. 
55  Asahi Shimbun, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command: “U.S. Reserves Right to Withdraw RIMPAC 
Invitation to China”, 15 June 2015 (the articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer 
accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
56  Jiji Press, Surveillance in S. China Sea Should Be Considered: Japan Defense Chief, 19 August 2015 (the 
articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the author; 
all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
57  Asahi Shimbun, Once Again, Abe’s Disdain For the Diet And the Public is Evident, 20 August 2015 (the 
articles quoted from the website of Asahi Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the author; 
all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
58  The Economic Times, Japan May Consider Joining US Forces in South China Sea Patrols: Military, 25 
June 2015 (the article quoted is no longer accessible but available from the author; the date of the article is 
the dates of access). 
59  I acknowledge gratefully this information from Dr Kim Tongfi, PRIF. Kyodo, Japan to Mull SDF Dispatch 
to S. China Sea: Abe, 20 November 2015 (the articles quoted from the website of Kyodo are no longer 
accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
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more coherent policy by the littoral states in the face of vociferous Chinese opposition to 
any Japanese political, let alone military involvement in the SCS. The littoral states are 
therefore concerned about China’s reaction and their own capacities. A recently made 
proposal for an Asian Multirole Patrol Aircraft Coalition by Waguri Hiroshi of the 
Japanese Defence Ministry tried to make such a Japanese involvement politically less 
delicate but the author accepted the above concerns (Waguri 2015). It is, however, 
noteworthy that according to a poll in November 2015, 52.7% of Japanese respondents 
agreed with the dispatch of the SDF to the SCS for “cautionary surveillance” (keikai 
kanshi), with 39.9% opposing it.60 However, there are also operational limitations on such 
a Japanese involvement because the Japanese military is already overstretched with its 
patrols in the ECS and Chinese retribution could easily make these tasks even more 
difficult.  
In the interim, Japan tries to show support for a greater military presence in the SCS 
by making use of the regular transit of its MSDF ships and patrol aircraft (P3C) between 
the east coast of Africa and Japan. Ships and aircraft are relieved every three months and 
have to stop over in between for refueling. While in the past Singapore and Thailand were 
the main stop-over countries, they are now those countries more directly involved in the 
disputes like Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia. These stop-overs are also used for 
defence exchanges and exercises.61 Still, it is hard to imagine that Japan will soon follow 
its security partner Australia which has been conducting FONOPs in the SCS for some 
time (Greene/Birtles 2015). 
9.  Conclusions 
Japan’s policy towards the SCS is part of a wider political, economic and military rivalry 
with China which ranges from competition over the shaping of economic and political 
regionalism to protecting the freedom of navigation. Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive 
peace diplomacy” is clearly inspired and driven by this narrative of China as a competitor 
and security challenge. As shown in Chapter 5, Japanese companies have important 
interests in the hydrocarbon resources in the SCS, notably within the EEZ of Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, which creates a potential security dilemma because some 
of the oil and gas fields are within or at least near China’s unclear 10-dash line. To 
preserve its economic, political and security interests in the region, Japan has embarked 
on a multitude of multilateral and bilateral policies although the latter seem now to enjoy 
greater preference. Their aim is to support ASEAN’s economic, political and military 
resilience and cohesion. Although Japan’s security-related policies towards the littoral 
states of the SCS are still limited to military and coast guard exchanges, capacity-building, 
 
 
60  Kyodo News poll, quoted by Michael Cucek in his blog on 1 December 2015, http://shisaku.blogspot.nl/. 
61  Yomiuri Shimbun, MSDF to Cover More of South China Sea, 10 January 2016 (the articles quoted from 
the website of Yomiuri Shimbun are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the 
articles are the dates of access). 
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observation of military exercises, or the conduct of coast guard exercises, the military 
aspect may become more pronounced over time, propelled by China’s assertive SCS 
policies and by Prime Minister Abe’s stronger security policies which aim at a wider 
regional security role for Japan. The consequences of a deepening military relationship 
with the US, the linkage made between the threat perception of developments in the ECS 
and the SCS, and concern about US support for Japan’s interests in the ECS reinforce this 
military aspect. As outlined in Chapter 7, the coastguard organisations of the littoral 
countries are weak and Japan’s provision of coast guard vessels, and surveillance aircraft 
as well as training make a considerable difference although this support can only be very 
relative in view of China’s overwhelming coast guard force.  
However, there are political difficulties and costs in implementing Japan’s 
comprehensive policies towards the SCS, apart from enhanced security involvement being 
hindered by Japan’s still powerful pacifism, constitutional restraints and budgetary 
limitations. Moreover, even strengthening coast guards may not necessarily enhance 
regional stability as some authors have pointed out in view of China’s maritime militia 
(Erickson/Kennedy 2016). 
First of all, despite Japan’s encouragement to forge a common position of the 
territorial claimants concerning a binding set of behavioural regulations, such as through 
the planned binding Code of Conduct, the latter have different positions on the territorial 
issues and how to proceed, notably in view of maintaining good relations with China. 
Among the littoral states of the SCS there are divergences on maritime security priorities 
(smuggling, piracy, illegal fishing), apart from securing maritime borders or territories. 
The strong belief in “exclusive sovereignty” is a brake on coordination and cooperation 
even among the littoral states. Leadership change can unexpectedly alter national policies 
as the presidential elections in the Philippines in 2010 and then again in 2016 have shown. 
Consistency of national policies towards China is sometimes difficult to fathom or to 
work with for outsiders: Malaysia, which recently has become more vocal about its 
opposition to China’s fishing activities within Malaysian-claimed EEZ and is militarily 
becoming more prepared to protect its maritime interests, nevertheless offered China’s 
navy in November 2015 the Kota Kinabalu port as a stop-over location, the base of 
Malaysia’s only two submarines (Wade 2015; Rahmat 2015). If therefore Japan pushes the 
littoral states too hard, or emphasizes too much military means to resist China, some of 
the claimants might take their distance to Japan’s policies, or it may lead to differences 
among the claimants becoming more explicit (Sataka 2016). 
Secondly, coordination and cooperation with the US will not always be smooth, in 
particular in view of current isolationist urges as became apparent in the presidential 
election campaign. There are subtle differences between Japan and the US in emphasis of 
what region is more important and where/how to deploy limited resources: Japan’s focus 
is primarily on Northeast Asia and notably the ECS, whereas the US has a global 
perspective and the SCS is considered particularly important. The US has always greater 
expectations of the scope of Japan’s contributions than Tokyo is willing to consider as the 
various US statements on Japanese participation in naval and air patrols have shown. As 
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much as Japan’s new security legislation is welcomed by the US, there are also doubts on 
how far Japan will follow through with it.  
There is also danger that Japanese assistance, in cooperation with the US or on its own, 
might encourage one of the SCS claimants other than China to act provocatively and raise 
tensions. Pajon mentions the case of the Philippines which sent its newly acquired 
second-hand US frigate to monitor Chinese fishing vessels in Scarborough Shoal in April 
2012 which showed Manila’s willingness to escalate the confrontation with China (Pajon 
2013: 33). 
Finally, there is China’s strong opposition to any country outside the SCS to oppose its 
advances in the region. China can easily undermine Japan’s (and other concerned 
countries’) warnings and coalition building against Chinese actions in the SCS by 
pointing out that it does not inhibit the Freedom of Navigation which is largely true – for 
the time being. However, in the absence of agreed EEZ borders and increasing fishing 
disputes among almost all littoral countries, China’s build-up of its coast guard and 
maritime force in the SCS gives rise to concern. Particularly worrying is the construction 
of facilities on the newly created islands which China declares as being only “light 
armament” and supposedly serving the safety of navigation in the region, apart from 
China’s legitimate defence needs. The possible future introduction of radar, fighter 
aircraft and anti-ship/anti-air missiles or the establishment of an ADIZ could then easily 
be explained by China as a reaction to preventive measures by the US and its allies. 
China is obviously irked by Japan raising the SCS issue in international fora like the 
G7, G20, or APEC.62 In its statements directed against Japan, Chinese officials have not 
hesitated to remind the world of Japan’s former occupation of the SCS and to declare that 
China is on “high alert against Japan’s attempt to return to the South China Sea through 
military means”.63 A Chinese scholar commented in the Global Times that joint patrols 
will help Japan with its American ally, and “help distract China’s strategic and tactical 
attention from the Diaoyu Islands dispute and alleviate the pressure on Japan” (Li 
Kaisheng 2015). 
Other attempts to put pressure on Japan to abandon its involvement in the SCS is to 
make high level exchanges with Japan (such as a planned visit by Abe to China in 2016), 
the general improvement of the bilateral relationship, or the finalizing of discussions 
about a communication system during emergencies in the ECS, contingent on Japan’s 
“reasonable” behaviour concerning the SCS (Sun 2016; Li Kaisheng 2015).64  
 
 
62  Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 13 November 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1314671.shtml. 
63  Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 7 March 2016, 
http://bit.ly/2a0q22S. 
64  NHK, China Blames Japan for Delayed Maritime Hotline, 29 June 2016 (the articles quoted from the 
website of NHK are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the 
dates of access). 
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There are signs that China is using heightened tensions in the ECS to deter Japan in 
the SCS. As shown in Chapter 4, Japan supports the other littoral countries albeit not 
their territorial claims because it hopes that this will improve its political position against 
China in the ECS while at the same time deepening the military alliance with the US to 
strengthen its military position. China’s pressure on Japan in the ECS indirectly puts 
pressure on the US which does not like to get involved in the territorial dispute of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The developments of Chinese naval movements in the ECs, the 
record number of Japanese scramble activities against Chinese aircraft over the ECS, 
China’s continuous expansion of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea while EEZ 
borders are not yet agreed upon, in addition to the regular Chinese coast guard patrols 
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, have been partly attributed by observers in Japan to 
China trying to deter Japan’s involvement in the SCS (Collin 7 October 2015; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1 June 2016).65 Other conceivable countermeasures in future might be the 
obstruction of Japanese oil and gas companies in SCS areas which are disputed but where 
China so far has not yet used coercive means to enforce its claims.  
Looking at this Japanese-Chinese action-reaction pattern against the background of 
US-China power competition, Japan’s strategic interests and the obvious willingness of 
the SCS littoral states to welcome Japan’s involvement to various degrees, how effective 
can Japan’s SCS policies under the banner of Abe’s Proactive Peace Diplomacy be 
evaluated? From a Chinese perspective, supporting the other claimants even without 
endorsing their territorial claims makes Japan a trouble maker. Unfortunately China’s 
assertive policies is perceived as not only challenging the territorial status quo, regional 
stability, international law, and the inadmissibility of coercive conflict resolution, but at 
the same time as challenging the existing distribution of power which is creating tensions 
and dangers. China’s denial of any legitimacy of involvement by Japan (as well as by any 
other concerned parties) is unhelpful. Whether the territorial status quo and the current 
distribution of power is fair or can remain as it is, is yet another issue which could not be 
discussed here. So far, Abe’s diplomacy has only led to China becoming even more 
adamant and forceful in the ECS as the August 2016 incident has shown when up to 14 
Chinese government vessels entered either the Contiguous Zone or even the Territorial 
waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to accompany over 200 Chinese fishing boats 
and to demonstrate China’s sovereignty of the islands as well as its dissatisfaction with 
Japan’s policy towards the SCS (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8 August 2016; Deng 2016). 
All the time, China is reinforcing its territorial position militarily, politically and 
economically in the SCS. China’s downright refusal to abide by the Arbitral Award of 12 
July 2016, even at reputational costs and encouraging the littoral countries to align more 
with Western countries like the US and Japan, shows that the application of Abe’s 
“proactive peace diplomacy” has so far not contributed to show the way to a compromise 
 
 
65  NHK, ASDF Scrambles Against Chinese Planes Surge, 30 June 2016; Yomiuri Shimbun, New Provocation 
by Chinese Navy Ship, 17 June 2016 (the articles quoted from the websites of NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun 
are no longer accessible but available from the author; all dates of the articles are the dates of access). 
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in the SCS, but has on the contrary led to a deterioration of the confrontation in the ECS. 
Given the above mentioned three political difficulties, it seems that Japan can do nothing 
constructively for a reduction of tension in the SCS within the current framework of its 
alliance and political-economic interests, as well as against the background of China’s 
unyielding territorial stance and its tense relationship with China. In the end, the more 
determining factors for achieving regional stability in the SCS lie with the US-China 
relationship and the reactions of the other claimants to it.  
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ADIZ  Air Defense Identification Zone 
ADMM  ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
AIIB  Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ECS  East China Sea 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FON  Freedom of Navigation 
FONOPs  Freedom of Navigation Operations 
IMB  International Maritime Bureau 
JOGMEC  Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party 
LNG Liquified Natural Gas 
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
MOEC  Mitsui Oil Exploration Co 
MRRV  Multi-Role Response Vessels 
MSDF Maritime Self-Defense 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
PHIBLEX  Philippine-US Combat Training Exercise 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army 
ReCAAP  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia 
SCS South China Sea 
SDF Self Defense Forces (Japan) 
SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication 
UNCLOS UN Convention on Law of the Sea 
